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Work in progress: Iran and P5+1 
 
By Sverre Lodgaard, NUPI 
 
The big powers and Iran have agreed to keep the contents of the ongoing 
negotiations to themselves, except that the United States is briefing Israel after 
each meeting by a tradition to be upheld. Some elements of a future deal have 
nevertheless been indicated, and other elements are known from comments and 
discussions in other settings
1
.    
 
At the September meeting between Iran and the P5+1, convened in connection 
with Hassan Rouhani’s visit to the UN, the parties agreed to develop an outline 
of the end state, i.e. the final agreement that would resolve the conflict over 
Iran’s nuclear program, and a road map visualizing how to get there. 
Presumably, the talks in Geneva 7-9 November focused on the end state and the 
first leg of the road map. 
 
The end state has three main elements. For Iran, recognition of the right to 
enrich is a must. The confidence building measure that was discussed in the 
autumn of 2009 (and which Brazil and Turkey clinched with the Iranians in the 
spring of 2010
2
, to no avail), indirectly acknowledged the fact that Iran was 
enriching uranium. At the time, the United States was ready to issue a letter of 
support for the agreement, but not to be a party to it. So far, Washington has not 
been willing to acknowledge that the NPT confers such a right on the Islamic 
republic. The question is if the Administration is ready to do so now, as part of 
the end state.  
 
In return, Iran would accept a number of limitations on its nuclear program. The 
issues are by and large known from public debate: a limitation on the degree of 
enrichment to, say, 5 percent, enough for use in power reactors; a limitation of 
the scale of enrichment, i.e. on the number and capacity of the centrifuges; a 
limitation on the number of enrichment facilities, e.g. at Natanz only; and 
special restrictions on the heavy water reactor at Arak. There may be others.  
 
The restrictions would amount to a fire-gate between permitted civilian activities 
and prohibited military applications of nuclear energy. The Supreme leader has 
                                                 
1
 Foreign minister Laurent Fabius disregarded this rule when he said, openly, that France had three concerns: 
about the heavy-water rector at Arak, which should be montballed; about the Iranian stock of uranium enriched 
to 19.75 per cent, which should be sent out of the country; and about new generations of centrifuges that are 
more effective than the first ones. By saying this, he revealed what was not in the draft agreement crafted by 
Ashton, Kerry and Zarif. 
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 One parameter was different. The amount of enriched uranium to be sent abroad (toTurkey) was the same, but 
since Iran had continued its enrichment works, by the spring it had become s a smaller part of the total inventory. 
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emphasized that they must be compatible with Iranian sovereignty, but the 
operationalization of that concept is not known. It is hardly fixed; the 
negotiators want to retain some degree of flexibility for themselves, and the 
Supreme leader has allowed for that. Co-management of the nuclear program, 
with the United States or others, is ruled out. 
 
The third element is transparency. Full transparency was Rouhani’s initial offer. 
This comprises accession to the Additional Protocol; acceptance of code 3.1 of 
the subsidiary safeguards agreement, obliging Iran to inform the IAEA as soon 
as a decision to build a new facility has been made; and – quite possibly – 
voluntary inspection offers.  
 
The first leg of the road map involves a temporary suspension of parts of the 
Iranian program, e.g. for half a year, and the lifting of some sanctions in that 
period. EU sanctions are not quite as hard to remove as are American ones. In 
Geneva, Kerry had a special meeting with Ashton and Zarif exploring, 
presumably, the possibilities of EU sanctions relief and Iranian views of the 
significance/insignificance of specific measures. The US government has some 
options as well - one of them being a tacit message to third countries that they 
may import more oil from Iran without being sanctioned against - but Congress 
is holding the government in tight reins. If the negotiations do not produce early 
results, Congress may impose additional sanctions. 
 
During the period of suspension, transparency measures will be pursued. The 
technicalities will be worked out between Iran and the IAEA. The relationship 
between that track and the Iran-P5+1 negotiations is unclear. Generally, 
however, the former is subordinated to the latter.  
 
An outcome along these lines combines elements from both legal platforms: 
the NPT and the Security Council resolutions. The end state draws on the NPT: 
Articles IV and III give member states the right to conduct fuel cycle activities 
as long as they act in conformity with articles I and II. In some form or other, 
this has to be acknowledged. The Security Council resolutions require Iran to 
suspend its fuel cycle works (and accept the Additional Protocol):  the first step 
builds on that requirement, defining a time-limited suspension of sensitive parts 
of the nuclear program.  
 
What can third countries do?    
 
Big powers prefer to handle their own conflicts. Third parties are kept at a 
distance. Still, there are a few things that other countries can do in support of a 
diplomatic resolution of the conflict. 
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First, third countries can stress that the outcome must be based on international 
law. For all the speculations about use of force, and despite the fact than 
international law knows no graver crime than wars of aggression, references to 
international law have been glaringly absent. It is as if the salience of the matter 
- for Israel and the United States in particular – has put international law out of 
order.   
 
Second, third countries may emphasize that the final state must be based on the 
NPT, which is the normative backbone of international non-proliferation 
policies. Presumably, this is what makes it possible for Iran to accept that the 
first step would be a time-limited suspension. Rouhani has tried this route once 
before - in the period 2003-2005, when he was chief negotiator. However, after 
one and a half years, he was offered little in return and was heavily criticized for 
his failure to achieve a honorable result. Now, there can be no repeat: hence a 
fixed short-term suspension, and recognition of the right to enrich in the final 
package. 
 
Third, third parties can act to soften the scepticism and opposition to a 
negotiated agreement in the United States and Iran. European countries should 
not be passive observers, but lean on members of Congress and explain the 
advantages of a diplomatic settlement. Countries that have business-like 
relations with Iran should do the same vis a vis Iranian sceptics. The more time 
that passes without a substantial agreement being reached, the stronger the nay-
sayers will become. 
 
Third parties may tell the sceptics that they do not have to trust the other side:  
instead, they can place their trust in the agreement. Either the agreement is 
complied with; or, if it is not, the combination of program limitations and 
comprehensive verification provides for “detection before consummation”, i.e. a 
warning time long enough to allow the US president to act on his promise to 
bomb before Iran gets the bomb.    
 
Fourth, both Western intelligence and the IAEA claim that up to 2003, parts of 
Iran’s nuclear program were weapon-oriented. US intelligence says Iran stopped 
that year, while the IAEA indicates that some such activities may still be going 
on. Ideally, the historical record should be straightened. However, it may be 
hard to put all questions about activities prior to 2003 to rest. Insofar as they are 
judged to be of little consequence for current and future affairs, they may as well 
be “grandfathered”. Dubious activities of a later date must, however, be 
resolved.  
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In the safeguards field there are devils in many details, offering ample ground 
for spoilers. However, the Governing Board of the IAEA has 35 members, and 
third country governors can help keep the main stakeholders “honest”.   
 
Fifth, if Iran follows up on its conciliatory approach while France and/or the 
United States are unwilling to reciprocate in a timely and appropriate manner, 
the P5+1 and the sanctions regime may unravel. The US administration has to 
attend to that scenario. There is little doubt that the US sanctions leverage has 
peaked. China, in particular, is inlikely to forsake its economic and strategic 
interests indefinitely to please the US Congress. A conciliatory Iran seeking 
win-win solutions is attractive to many other countries as well.      
 
In the period 2003-2005, the Europeans were under the influence of US 
thinking, which downgraded the role of diplomacy and saw talks as rewards for 
good behaviour. Also, Europeans may have had in mind to negotiate bazar 
style.
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 If so, it was a misjudgement: 2003-2005 was a great opportunity lost. 
This time, there can be no re-run of such attitudes and practices. Since US 
sanctions are the hardest to lift, it is primarily up to the European countries to 
offer the necessary sanctions relief to clinch an agreement.  
 
                                 ----------------------------------------- 
 
In Iran, there is a struggle between those who want Iran to behave as a nation 
caring for its national interests, and those who stick to the revolutionary track 
opposing the United States and its allies. The sanctions had a sobering effect that 
catapulted Rouhani to the presidency: today, he has a broad domestic platform 
for his policies, underwritten by the Supreme leader. However, that platform 
may vanish quickly for lack of reciprocal action. 
 
The United States is in a similar situation. On the one hand, it is in its national 
interest to move resources and political attention toward East Asia and China.  
An agreement with Iran can, furthermore, yield significant dividends also in the 
Middle East. On the other hand, the hard core opposition wants to maximize 
pressures on the Islamic Republic to make it crumble. In the United States as 
well as in Iran, national interests are up against US-Iran cold war loyalists.  
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